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Specific Performance of Separation Agreements: Is the
Remedy Enforceable?
Long after divorced couples have ended their emotional and phys-
ical relationships, financial ties may linger. As a result of either court-
ordered alimony or voluntary payments made in compliance with sepa-
ration agreements, ex-husbands frequently are obligated to send
monthly checks to their former wives' in fulfillment of their continuing
"duty of support."2 If the ex-husband refuses to honor his obligation,
courts face the task of enforcement. When court-imposed alimony is at
issue, North Carolina courts have been consistent in their willingness to
hold the defaulting husband in contempt of court, 3 a holding that can
result in a j all sentence.4 When the payments represent only a contrac-
tual obligation occasioned by a separation agreement, however, the
North Carolina courts have refused to invoke their contempt power,5
1. In recent years, courts and legislatures have indicated that if the wife were the supporting
spouse, she would be required to continue that support after divorce or separation. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 83, 592 P.2d 1165, 1169, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413, 417 (1979) ("Hus-
band and wife assume a mutual obligation of support upon marriage.") (relying on CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5 100 (West 1970); "Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of mutual
respect, fidelity and support.")
Thus, recognizing that in some cases an ex-wife might be required to support her former
husband but acknowledging that the overwhelming majority of cases in this area concern wives
seeking support from husbands, this Note generally will speak of the duty of support as flowing
from husband to wife. For a completely accurate understanding, however, the reader should read
'wife" and "husband" interchangeably.
2. Although the duty of support technically ends when the marriage ends, it is often ex-
tended into the nonmarital state by an agreement between the parties or by the judicial imposition
of alimony. The duty of a husband to support his wife derives from the common law and remains
substantially intact today, equal rights between the sexes notwithstanding. Compare Manby v.
Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 784 (1659):
[T]he husband is bound of common right to provide for and maintain his wife; and
the law having disabled the wife to bind herself by her contract, therefore the burden
shall rest upon the husband, who by law is bound to maintain her and he shall do it
nolens volens [whether willing or unwilling]: generally the antecedent is most true; for
she is "bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh," and no man did ever hate his own flesh so far
as not to preserve it.
with Newport v. Newport, - Va. - -, 245 S.E.2d 134, 139 (1978):
[T]he duty of a husband to support his wife is a moral as well as a legal obligation; it is a
marital duty, in the performance of which the public as well as the parties are interested;
it is a duty which is an incident to the marriage state and arises from the relation of the
marriage; and it is an inherent right which may be asserted in a divorce suit or in an
independent suit therefor.
3. See, e.g., Whitesides v. Whitesides, 271 N.C. 560, 157 S.E.2d 82 (1967); Pain v. Pain, 80
N.C. 322 (1879).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-12(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979), quoted at note 14 infra.
5. See, e.g., Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956); Stanley v. Stanley, 226
N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946); Davis v. Davis, 213 N.C. 537, 196 S.E. 819 (1938).
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holding that the use of this power could lead to a violation of the con-
stitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.6 This refusal has
left many ex-wives without effective means of collecting support pay-
able pursuant to a separation agreement. A partial solution to this
problem was recently delineated in Moore v. Moore,7 when the North
Carolina Supreme Court granted plaintiff-wife a decree of specific per-
formance to compel her former husband to honor the terms of their
separation agreement. The ultimate viability of this remedy is left in
substantial doubt, however, because the court failed to determine
whether the decree of specific performance is, in turn, enforceable by
the use of the contempt power.
Mr. and Mrs. Moore executed a separation agreement in 1972 in
which Mr. Moore agreed to pay his wife $250.000 per month "as ali-
mony."" When the parties later divorced, however, this agreement ap-
parently was not made part of the divorce decree.9 Mr. Moore ceased
making payments in July 1975. Six months later, Mrs. Moore obtained
a judgment for accrued arrearages, but execution on the judgment was
returned unsatisfied.' 0 During the following year, plaintiff initiated ad-
ditional actions to satisfy the judgment, but these were also ineffec-
tive.' 1 Mrs. Moore finally brought suit in superior court in 1977,
6. See N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 28, quoted at note 15 infra.
7. 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979).
8. Id. at 14, 252 S.E.2d at 736. More precisely, the support provision in the separation
agreement required defendant-husband to pay plaintiff-wife $250.00 per month. The agreement
stipulated that defendant's obligation to make support payments would end upon plaintiff's re-
marriage or would be reduced to $175.00 a month if plaintiff remained unmarried at age 65.
Record at 11-12, Moore v. Moore, 38 N.C. App. 700, 248 S.E.2d 761 (1978), rep'd, 297 NC. 14,.
252 S.E.2d 735 (1979). Although designated "as alimony" in the separation agreement, these pay-
ments were not technically alimony because they did not have the force of a court order. See text
accompanying note 29 infra.
9. 297 N.C. at 14, 252 S.E.2d at 736. It is not apparent why the agreement was not made
part of the decree. Generally, a supporting spouse would favor an arrangement in which the
agreement is not made part of the divorce decree because such an agreement is not modifiable by
the court and the dependent spouse may not later appeal for an increase in the support payments.
Dependent spouses, on the other hand, usually favor making the agreement part of the decree
because it gives them the option of requesting the court to increase payments due to changed
circumstances or to force payment that is not forthcoming from the supporting spouse. See, e.g.,
Howland v. Stitzer, 236 N.C. 230, 72 S.E.2d 583 (1952). See also note 30 infra.
10. 297 N.C. at 14, 252 S.E,2d at 736. In January 1976, the Wake County District Court
decreed that defendant owed plaintiff$1,500.00 plus interest. In February, execution on the judg-
ment was issued and given to the Sheriff of Wake County; it was returned unsatisfied. Record at
3-4.
11. A supplemental proceeding was held in August 1976, at which defendant was questioned
about assets available to satisfy the judgment. Defendant testified that he had remarried and was
earning approximately $20,000 per year. He stated that, upon receiving his bimonthly salary
check, he immediately endorsed it to his second wife, who deposited it in her individual checking
account. Defendant further stated that he and his second wife owned a house as tenants by the
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requesting judgment for arrearages accrued since the first judgment
and a court order directing defendant to specifically perform the sup-
port provisions of the separation agreement. The court entered judg-
ment against Mr. Moore for arrearages of $4,875.00, but denied
plaintiff's request for specific performance. 2 The court of appeals af-
firmed on both issues,1 3 but the supreme court reversed the trial court
denial of specific performance.
The court of appeals refused to grant the decree because it viewed
the request for specific performance as an effort by plaintiff to compel
defendant to comply with the support provisions of the agreement
under threat of being jailed for contempt 14 in violation of the North
Carolina constitutional proscription against imprisonment for debt. 5
In its reasoning the court of appeals relied on a long line of cases defin-
ing separation agreements not incorporated into judicial decrees as
contracts that are, therefore, unenforceable by imprisonment because
default on the agreement is a contract debt. 6 The court recognized,
entirety and that his wife held title to all personal property owned by them. In essence, defendant
had no personal assets from which the judgment could be satisfied. At a hearing in September
1976, a Wake County district court judge denied plaintif's motion to garnish defendant's wages
but agreed to appoint a receiver. Mrs. Moore did not pursue that alternative. Id. at 15, 252 S.E.2d
at 737; Record at 11-12.
12. 297 N.C. at 15, 252 S.E.2d at 737.
13. 38 N.C. App. 700, 248 S.E.2d 761 (1978), rev'd, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979).
14. 38 N.C. App. at 701, 248 S.E.2d at 761. A North Carolina court may cite in contempt
anyone who willfully refuses to obey its orders. The court's contempt power includes the author-
ity to imprison offenders. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A- 11 (Cum. Supp. 1979) lists as criminal contempt:
"(3) Willful disobedience of, resistance to, or interference with a court's lawful process, order,
directive, or instruction or its execution." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-12(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979) states
that "[a] person who commits criminal contempt, whether direct or indirect, is subject to censure,
imprisonment up to 30 days, fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00), or any combination
of the three." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21 (Cum. Supp. 1979) defines civil contempt as failure to
comply with a court order while it is in force when both the purpose of the order will be served by
compliance and the offending party is able to comply. A judge is authorized to imprison a civil
contemnor for as long as the contempt continues. For examples of the court's use of its contempt
powers, see Mauney v. Mauney, 268 N.C. 254, 150 S.E.2d 391 (1966); Gaylon v. Stutts, 241 N.C.
120, 84 S.E.2d 822 (1954); Osmar v. Crosland-Osmar, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 721, 259 S.E.2d 771
(1979).
15. The North Carolina Constitution, like many state constitutions, see note 45 infra, protects
its citizens from imprisonment for debt. The constitution states: "There shall be no imprisonment
for debt in this State, except in cases of fraud." N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 28. Alimony is excepted
from this provision, however. See text accompanying notes 48-53 infra.
16. The cases relied on by the court of appeals were Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 154
S.E.2d 71 (1967) and Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946). The Stanley case
addressed the issue most directly. The court described the separation agreement and its effect
thusly: "This agreement was an extrajudicial transaction, and although between husband and
wife, and relating to the support of the wife, had no more sanction for its enforcement than any
other civil contract; certainly not that of imprisonment through civil contempt for noncompli-
ance." 226 N.C. at 133, 37 S.E.2d at 120.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
based on the facts established concerning Mr. Moore's financial status1 7
and his past failures to pay the amounts owed, that the indebtedness
was the result of willful refusal rather than an inability to pay. The
court therefore assumed that another judicial order would not precipi-
tate payment, and anticipated another suit by plaintiff to enforce the
decree of specific performance through a contempt proceeding."8 Be-
cause the court was unwilling to grant a contempt citation, it saw no
purpose in granting the decree for specific performance.
In reversing the court of appeals' holding on specific performance,
the North Carolina Supreme Court did not address the contempt issue.
In a terse opinion, the court reiterated the well-established principles
that a marital agreement not incorporated into a divorce decree is sub-
ject to the same enforcement procedures as any other contract and that
a decree of specific performance is available to enforce a contract when
plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. 9 The court assessed the legal
remedies available to plaintiff, determined that they were inadequate
because of the multiplicity of suits required and their probable lack of
success, and remanded the case for entry of a decree ordering defen-
dant to specifically perform his support obligation under the separation
agreement as to both the arrearages and future payments.20
The issue of enforcement of support provisions included in a sepa-
ration agreement is fraught with difficulties ranging from semantic con-
fusion to constitutional problems. The starting point for analysis is the
agreement itself-a civil contract between husband and wife entered
into at the time of or subsequent to separation. 21 A separation agree-
ment customarily includes provisions for the support of the dependent
spouse and minor children as well as a property settlement.22 Although
17. At the supplemental proceeding, defendant admitted he earned $20,000 a year. See note
11 supra.
18. 38 N.C. App. at 701, 248 S.E.2d at 761.
19. 297 N.C. at 16, 252 S.E.2d at 737.
20. Id. at 17-19, 252 S.E.2d at 738-39.
21. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS ch. 16 (1968).
22. 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMY LAW § 187, at 379 (3d ed. 1963). See generally N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Although many separation agreements do not make a
distinction between support provisions and property settlements, courts do. See, e.g., Colvert v.
Colvert, 568 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977); Hecht v. Hecht, 259 Cal. App. 2d 1, 67 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1968).
Property settlements and support payments are enforced and taxed differently. These differences
are beyond the scope of this note. It will be assumed for present purposes, however, that the
provisions are distinguishable and that those at issue are solely payments for the support of the
dependent spouse. For a general discussion of property settlements and support payments, see
Comment, The Economics of Divorce: Alimony and Property Awards, 43 U. CiN. L. Rnv. 133
(1974). The tax implications of property settlements and support payments are discussed in Du-
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once considered violative of public policy,' the separation agreement
has been recognized for most of this century as an appropriate method
for estranged couples to settle their financial affairs.24 Once entered,
the agreement remains in force as a contract as long as the spouses
remain separated,2" and the remedies for its breach are the same as for
any other contract.
26
Complications may arise, however, if the couple subsequently ob-
tains a divorce. The divorce decree may treat the separation agreement
in any number of ways, and this treatment determines how the agree-
ment can be enforced. At one extreme is the situation in which the
separation agreement is not presented to the court. The agreement sur-
vives the divorce decree and the dependent spouse can sue in contract
in case of breach of the agreement.27 At the other extreme is merger, a
situation in which the divorce decree supersedes the separation agree-
ment, so that the agreement ceases to exist. The aggrieved party thus
has enforcement rights under the decree, but no longer has contractual
rights.' As a result, any support payments required by the decree are
considered alimony, even if they are identical to the payments that
were required by the separation agreement.29 Having the force of a
court decree, the payments may be enforced by the contempt power.3
Canto, Determination of Issue of Properly Settlement as Opposed to "Periodic Payments" "(A/K/A
"Alimony'), 55 CHI. B. REC. 130 (1973).
23. See Collins v. Collins, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 153 (1867) (North Carolina Supreme Court
refused to acknowledge or enforce a separation agreement on the ground that to do so would
undermine the sanctity and integrity of marriage).
24. Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 409,74 S.E. 327 (1912), is the seminal case establishing the
validity of separation agreements in North Carolina. The change in judicial attitude was precipi-
tated by the legislature's adoption of a statute recognizing separation agreements. The modem
version of this statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979), provides that "[a]ny married
couple, both of whom are 18 years of age or over, is hereby auhorized to execute a separation
agreement not inconsistent with public policy which shall be legal, valid, and binding in all re-
spects."
25. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 51, 134 S.E.2d 227, 230 (1964); Turner v.
Turner, 242 N.C. 533, 538, 89 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1955).
26. 2 R. LEE, supra note 22, § 201, at 423-24; see text accompanying notes 40-43 infra, J.
MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 220, at 439-41 (2d rev. ed. 1974). Seegeneraly Annot., 154
A.L.R. 323 (1945).
27. 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENT AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 31, at 31-80
(1979).
28. Id. at 31-87, 88.
29. H. CLARK, supra note 21, § 16.12, at 554.
30. Enforcement procedures relating to alimony are generally controlled by statute. Id.
§ 14.10, at 465. In addition to the contempt power, courts may have the authority to appoint a
receiver or enforce judgments by execution. Id. In North Carolina, for example, the applicable
statute reads: "An order for the payment of alimony or alimony pendente lite is enforceable by
proceedings for civil contempt and its disobedience may be punished by proceedings for criminal
contempt, as provided in Chapter 5A, Contempt, of the General Statutes." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
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Between these two extremes lies a variety of alternatives. Under
all of the variations, however, support payments ultimately are consid-
ered either as a contractual obligation or as alimony and are enforce-
able accordingly. The language used by the court when dealing with
the agreement, as well as the intentions of the parties, are the primary
factors used in determining whether the agreement has been merged or
survived.31 Commonly, courts incorporate the separation agreement
into the divorce decree. Some states consider this a merger,32 while
others hold that the agreement survives.33
North Carolina courts align themselves with the former group,
and hold that incorporation extinguishes the agreement. 34 Determin-
ing when an agreement has been incorporated by a North Carolina
court, however, is not without its own difficulties. In Bunn . Bunn,35
the supreme court summarized general guidelines for distinguishing in-
corporated from unincorporated agreements in the context of consent
judgments, which are often entered when a couple seeks a divorce
based upon separation for the statutory period and presents an agree-
ment to the court. The court explained:
Consent judgments for the payment of subsistence to the wife are of
two kinds. In one, the court merely approves or sanctions the pay-
ments which the husband has agreed to make for the wife's support
and sets them out in a judgment against him. Such a judgment con-
stitutes nothing more than a contract between the parties made with
the approval of the court. Since the court itself does not in such case
order the payments, the amount specified therein is not technically
alimony. In the other, the court adopts the agreement of the parties
as its own determination of their respective rights and obligations
16.7() (Cum. Supp. 1979). In addition, the court can usually modify an alimony provision upon
application of a party showing changed circumstances, while the court generally does not have
this power if the separation agreement survives the divorce decree. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 27, at
31-64. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9 (1976) (authorizes modification of an alimony award).
Some courts, however, allow modification of support decrees despite their contractual nature. See
Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 520, 530.
3 1. For a fuller treatment of this issue, see Comment, Divorce Agreements." Independent Con-
tract or Incorfporation in Decree, 20 U. CHi. L. REv. 138, 146 (1952).
32. See, e.g., Hicks v. Hicks, 417 P.2d 830, 832 (Okla. 1966) ("The agreement was incorpo-
rated in toto in the decree of divorce and by such incorporation the agreement as such was extin-
guished.").
33. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kennington, 204 So. 2d 444, 449 (Miss. 1967) ("Neither the
approval of the contract by the trial court nor the incorporation in the decree of its provisions
relating to the monthly payments, had the effect of stripping the obligation of its contract charac-
ter, or converting the payments to alimony.").
34. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 256, 154 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1967) ("When the
parties' agreement with reference to the wife's support is incorporated in the judgment, their con-
tract is superseded by the court's decree.").
35. 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
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and orders the husband to pay the specified amounts as alimony.36
The same distinctions apply when the judgment was not obtained by
consent.37 In at least one case, in deference to the wishes of the parties,
the court incorporated the agreement by reference but refused to con-
sider it merged for purposes of enforcement.38 In light of the semantic
vagaries39 in this area, such a result is not surprising, though in the
usual case an agreement is either incorporated for all purposes into the
divorce decree or preserved in its status as a contract.
A decision that the separation agreement retains its contractual na-
ture forces courts to grapple with competing contract and constitutional
principles. The usual remedy for breach of contract is a suit at law for
money damages to compensate for losses already incurred.4" Ordi-
narily, this remedy is considered adequate to enforce a contract for the
payment of money in installments.4' Nevertheless, specific perfor-
mance is widely recognized as an appropriate method for enforcing
separation agreements. 42 The explanation given in Moore on the inad-
equacy of the remedy at law is typical:
IT]he plaintiff must wait until payments have become due and the
obligor has failed to comply. Plaintiff must then file suit for the
amount of accrued arrearage, reduce her claim to judgment, and, if
the defendant fails to satisfy it, secure satisfaction by execution. As is
so often the case, when the defendant persists in his refusal to com-
ply, the plaintiff must resort to this remedy repeatedly to secure her
rights under the agreement as the payments become due and the de-
36. Id. at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242.
37. See Levitch v. Levitch, 294 N.C. 437, 241 S.E.2d 506 (1978).
38. Williford v. Williford, 10 N.C. App. 529, 179 S.E.2d 113, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 301, 180
S.E.2d 178 (1971); accord, Williford v. Williford, 10 N.C. App. 451, 179 S.E.2d 114, cert denied,
278 N.C. 301, 180 S.E.2d 177 (1971) (connected case).
39. Language used by courts considering the relationship between the divorce decree and the
separation agreement is inconsistent. In Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956), for
example, the decree recited the terms of the agreement but did not order that the payments be
made. Thus, the defaulting spouse was not subject to contempt. In Dyer v. Dyer, 212 N.C. 620,
194 S.E. 278 (1937), on the other hand, the consent judgment required the husband to make sup-
port payments "pending further orders"; contempt was thereafter used to enforce the judgment.
See Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1957).
40. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 990, at 3; § 993, at 8 (1964).
41. Id. § 1147, at 157.
42. Id. That a separation agreement is specifically enforceable appears to be axiomatic. See
I A. LINDEY, supra note 27, at 25-20 (1962) ("It is well settled that unless a separation agreement
is 'iniquitous or oppressive,' the courts will decree specific performance."); 81 C.J.S. Specc Per-
formance § 99 (1977) ("Generally, separation agreements may be specifically enforced, on the
ground of lack of remedy at law, provided they are executed voluntarily and understandingly for
the purpose of settling the issue of support, as to either arrearages or future payments."). See, e.g.,
Doerfier v. Doerfier, 196 A.2d 90 (D.C. 1963); Stern v. Williams, 365 So. 2d 1128 (La. App, 1978);
Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285, 104 A.2d 573 (1954); Hoff v. Hoff, 157 N.J. Super. 503, 385 A.2d
253 (1978) (per curiam).
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fendant fails to comply. The expense and delay involved in this rem-
edy at law is evident. The nature of the contract, ie., providing for
the plaintiffs basic subsistence, is such that the remedy available at
law involves unusual and extreme hardship. 43
A lump-sum payment designed to cover the entire contract would not
be possible in this case because of the impossibility of ascertaining
when the payments might terminate as a result of plaintiffs remarriage
or death.
Despite the seeming appropriateness of a decree of specific per-
formance from a contract point of view, impediments to the utility of
such a decree exist. The decree will be of little help to a dependent
spouse if the court cannot enforce it. The most effective method avail-
able to the court for enforcement of its orders is its contempt power,
which includes the authority to jail those not in compliance.44 The use
of the contempt power to enforce an order to pay money, however, is
restricted by the common constitutional provision forbidding imprison-
ment for debt.45 It has been held in North Carolina that a debtor-cred-
itor relationship is created by an extrajudicial contract such as an
unincorporated separation agreement,46 making this a situation cov-
ered by the constitutional prohibition in all cases except those involving
fraud.47 In contrast, both North Carolina case law48 and statutory pro-
visions49 have excluded the payment of alimony from the constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment, despite the characterization of ali-
mony as a debt in other respects.50 The genesis of this distinction is
43. 297 N.C. at 17, 252 S.E.2d at 738.
44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5A-11, -12(a), -21 (Cum. Supp. 1979), quoted at note 14 supra.
45. Approximately four-fifths of the states have provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt.
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND STATE, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS: A 50-STATE
INDEX 25 (1980). For North Carolina's provision, see note 15 supra.
46. The court of appeals in Sainz v. Sainz, 36 N.C. App. 744, 745, 245 S.E.2d 372, 373 (1978),
approved the following holding of the trial court: "It is the law of North Carolina that an extraju-
dicial contract or agreement of separation between a husband and a wife wherein the husband
obligates himself to make periodic payments for the wife's support creates a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship and any judgment rendered for nonperformance is a debt."
47. Plaintiff in Moore argued in her brief that defendant's transfer of assets to his second wife
was fraudulent and, thus, that the constitutional prohibition should not apply. Plaintiff Appel-
lant's New Brief at 8-14. As defendant's brief correctly pointed out, however, the essential ele-
ments of fraud must be proved. Defendant Appellee's New Brief at 3-4 (relying on 6 N.C. INDEX,
Fraud § 1 (1976)). Though these elements were not pleaded and proved in Moore, they could be
presented in a future contempt proceeding involving the same parties or by other plaintiffs in
similar situations.
48. See, eg., Whitesides v. Whitesides, 271 N.C. 560, 564, 157 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1967); Wilson v.
Wilson, 261 N.C. 40, 43-44, 134 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964).
49. See note 30 supra.
50. See, eg., Morse v. Zatkiewiez, 5 N.C. App. 242, 245, 168 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1969).
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found in the court's desire to maintain the efficacy of its orders. In the
1879 case of Pain v. Pain,5 ' defendant-husband was ordered to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt for failure to make ali-
mony payments. In upholding the order, the supreme court said,
The allowance is not a debt within the meaning of the constitution
... for which imprisonment is not permitted. It is an order of a
competent court, only to be enforced as are other judicial commands
when necessary by process of attachment against the person. The
power to award the process is inherent in the court, essential to the
exercise of its jurisdiction and the maintenance of its authority.5 2
Underlying this exemption from the constitutional prohibition, there-
fore, is the perception that alimony is not only a duty owed to the wife,
but a duty owed to the public as well.5 The courts are well aware that
effectively enforcing this duty of husbands lessens the support burden
on society.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has never specifi-
cally enforced a separation agreement, neither has it refused to do so
because it apparently has never confronted this precise issue.5 4 The
two most analogous cases brought in North Carolina courts were de-
cided by the court of appeals. In Sainz v. Sainz,55 plaintiff had ob-
tained a decree of specific performance on an unincorporated
separation agreement in New York. The court of appeals refused to
recognize or adopt the decree, reasoning that enforcement of the decree
through the contempt power would violate the constitution.5 6 The
court of appeals used the same reasoning in Riddle v. Riddle57 to justify
the denial of an injunction requested by plaintiff-wife to enjoin her
51. 80 N.C. 322 (1879).
52. Id. at 325.
53. In State v. Morgan, 141 N.C. 726, 53 S.E. 142 (1906), defendant pleaded that he should
not be imprisoned for failure to support his child. The court rejected this argument and noted that
"It]his public duty can be enforced by appropriate remedy, like failure to work the public roads, to
serve on the jury, to serve in the army, to pay alimony ordered." Id. at 730, 53 S.E. at 143; see
Wilson v. Wilson, 261 N.C. 40, 43-44, 134 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964).
54. In prior cases in which enforcement of a separation agreement was sought, plaintiffs rou-
tinely asked the court to hold the defaulting defendant in contempt. In every case, the court
refused to grant plaintit's request unless the separation agreement had been incorporated into a
divorce decree. Compare Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956); Stanley v. Stanley,
226 N.C. 129,37 S.E.2d 118 (1946); Davis v. Davis, 213 N.C. 537, 196 S.E. 819 (1938) (all holding
the separation agreement not incorporated and thus not enforceable by contempt) with Stancil v.
Stancil, 255 N.C. 507, 121 S.E.2d 882 (1961); Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N.C. 181, 22 S.E.2d
576 (1942) (both holding separation agreement incorporated into the divorce decree and thus en-
forceable by contempt).
55. 36 N.C. App. 744, 245 S.E.2d 372 (1978).
56. Id. at 747, 245 S.E.2d at 374.
57. 32 N.C. App. 83, 230 S.E.2d 809 (1977).
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husband from breaching a separation agreement. These results are
now questionable given the supreme court's willingness in Aoore to
grant the decree of specific performance.
The court's opinion in Moore is perplexing in that, ostensibly, it
took no cognizance of the constitutional problem inherent in enforcing
the decree, even though this dilemma gave the court of appeals cause to
deny the decree of specific performance as it had denied similar decrees
in Sainz and Riddle. The supreme court distinguished the cases relied
upon by the court below, noting that in Moore plaintiff had not at-
tempted to invoke the court's contempt power, but merely had sought
an order compelling compliance with the separation agreement. 8 Ap-
parently, the supreme court believed the contempt problem was better
left to another occasion when the particular facts required a determina-
tion of that issue. It seems, however, that if the decree of specific per-
formance is not enforceable by a contempt action, as was held by the
court of appeals, the supreme court provided the plaintiff with very
little remedy. By not offering even dicta to indicate its position, the
court has not resolved satisfactorily "the troublesome issue of enforce-
ment of a marital separation agreement that has not been incorporated
into a judgment."59
It is possible, at least in this case, that the court will not be faced
with the problem of enforcing its decree of specific performance. Mr.
Moore may begin to meet his obligation on the strength of the court
order alone. As plaintiff argued in her brief, "it may well be that the
former spouse, the supporting spouse, would prefer the court to order
him to make payments so that he would no longer have to explain to
his new wife why he was 'giving' his money to a former spouse. '60 Fur-
ther, the court lias the option to issue writs of execution, attachment or
possession or to force a sale of property.6' But because Mrs. Moore
had so little success when she attempted to execute on her original su-
perior court judgment, the probabilities are that she soon will come
before the court requesting that defendant be jailed until he obeys the
order. Even if she does not, another plaintiff in a similar situation inev-
itably will, and the supreme court will be forced to determine whether
the decree is enforceable.
North Carolina courts clearly have the authority to hold a party in
58. 297 N.C. at 16, 252 S.E.2d at 737.
59. Id.
60. Plaintiff Appellant's New Brief at 20. Granted, this chance is exceedingly small.
61. 81A CJ.S. Specoc Performance § 219 (1977).
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civil and criminal contempt for willful disobedience of a court order.62
Therefore, it seems doctrinally sound to hold a defaulting husband in
contempt not for his indebtedness, but for his failure to comply with
the decree of specific performance. It is not clear, however, that the
North Carolina courts would make this distinction, which arguably cir-
cumvents the prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Though no
cases are specifically on point, State v. Caudle63 is sufficiently analo-
gous to shed some light on the probable proclivity of the court. De-
fendant in Caudle was convicted of fraudulent use of a credit card and
sentenced to jail for a year. His sentence was suspended on the condi-
tion that he reimburse the defrauded bank. When he refused, the
supreme court had to decide whether defendant could be jailed for his
failure to pay, assuming the failure was willful and without lawful ex-
cuse.6 4 In holding that defendant could not be jailed, the court said:
We have found no decision of this Court sustaining an order put-
ting into effect a prison sentence for the failure of the defendant to
pay obligations incurred by him otherwise than as the result of the
act for which he was originally convicted, with the exception of the
obligation imposed by law for the support of the defendant's wife or
child. In our opinion, it is not sufficient to say ... that when such
defendant is imprisoned he will be imprisoned for his criminal act
and not for his nonpayment of his debt. The purpose of the above
quoted provision [barring imprisonment for debt] was to prevent the
use of the criminal process to enforce the payment of civil obliga-
tions, directly or indirectly.65
Applying this reasoning to the facts in Moore, the imposition of a
prison sentence for failure to obey the decree of specific performance
would, in essence, be an indirect imprisonment for debt and, therefore,
violative of the constitution.
Other courts have been faced with the same issue, though consid-
ering the number of states that decree specific performance of separa-
tion agreements, surprisingly few opinions have dealt with it. A
District of Columbia case, O'Mara v. O'Mara,6 6 is most directly on
point. In O'Mara, plaintiff-wife obtained a decree of specific perfor-
mance to enforce a $200.00 per month support payment set out in a
separation agreement that had survived the divorce decree. When the
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5A-11, -12, -21 (Cum. Supp. 1979), quotedat note 14 supra.
63. 276 N.C. 550, 173 S.E.2d 778 (1970).
64. Id. at 553, 173 S.E.2d at 781.
65. Id. at 554-55, 173 S.E.2d at 782. The exception mentioned refers, of course, to judicially
decreed alimony rather than payments such as those at issue in Moore.
66. 238 A.2d 586 (D.C. 1968).
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trial court determined that the husband was able to pay, but refused to
do so, it found him in contempt. The court of appeals held the citation
invalid because it violated a statute forbidding imprisonment for debt
except in cases of alimony.67 Determining that payments pursuant to a
separation agreement were not alimony, the court vacated the order of
contempt and imprisonment. 68 Thus, the husband's defiance of a de-
cree for specific performance, in addition to his default on the agree-
ment, did not persuade the court to hold defendant in contempt.
Similarly, in the Indiana case of Risk v. Thompson,69 involving a split
between business partners rather than marital partners, the court re-
fused even to order a decree of specific performance on the ground that
"to attempt an enforcement of the payments of the installments would
result in imprisonment for debt in violation of a constitutional provi-
sion."' 7
Only Maryland appears to be in substantial disagreement on this
subject, by enforcing payments pursuant to an unincorporated separa-
tion agreement through contempt. Its practice, however, derives specif-
ically from its constitution, which expressly permits imprisonment for
such a debt.7
Although it is not clear exactly how the North Carolina Supreme
Court will resolve the issue when faced with it, it seems apparent that
use of the court's contempt power to enforce an unincorporated separa-
tion agreement will not be automatic.72 In addressing the problem the
67. The court relied on D.C. CODE § 15-320(c) (1967), which provides that, "where a decree
only directs the payment of money, the defendant may not be imprisoned except in those cases
especially provided for." The cases especially provided for involved a failure to pay alimony
pendente lite, failure to pay permanent alimony and failure to pay maintenance ordered by the
court for support of a wife or child, or for a former wife where the former husband has obtained a
foreign ex parte divorce. 238 A.2d at 587-88.
68. 238 A.2d at 588.
69. 237 Ind. 642, 147 N.E.2d 540 (1958) (per curiam).
70. Id. at 651, 147 N.E.2d at 545. Indiana's constitution provides that
[t]he privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life, shall be recognized by
wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for the
payment of any debt or liability hereafter contracted; and there shall be no imprison-
ment for debt, except in case of fraud.
IND. CONsT. art. I, § 22.
71. The Maryland constitution states:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt, but a valid decree of a court of competent juris-
diction or agreement approvedby a decree ofsaidcourt for the support of a wife or depen-
dent children, or for the support of an illegitimate child or children, or for alimony, shall
not constitute a debt within the meaning of this section.
MD. CONST. art. III, § 38 (emphasis added). See LaChance v. LaChance, 28 Md. App. 571, 346
A.2d 676 (1975); Speckler v. Speckler, 256 Md. 635, 261 A.2d 466 (1970).
72. If the court does hold that the decree of specific performance has made the separation
agreement enforceable by contempt, the next logical question will concern modifiability. Gener-
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court will at least be forced to reconcile its position in Caudle with its
answer to the question of whether a decree to specifically perform an
unincorporated separation agreement is enforceable by contempt, even
if it chooses not to follow the reasoning of the courts in other jurisdic-
tions holding that such a decree is not enforceable through the court's
contempt power. Yet the supreme court's grant of a decree for specific
performance in Moore is practically meaningless if the decree is not
enforceable by contempt. A holding that the decree is not enforceable
by contempt would be unfortunate because it would leave dependent
spouses without an effective remedy solely because their separation
agreements were merely approved rather than adopted by the courts.7 3
Alimony payments have long been exempted from the constitutional
provision because of the important public policy involved in enforcing
the duty of support.74 Yet payments made pursuant to a separation
agreement-fulfulling the same duty of support-lack this special sta-
tus. That a technical and confusing distinction should be determinative
is without wisdom or logic.
A possible solution would be for the court to practice judicial li-
cense and declare that the decree of specific performance converts the
extrajudicial support payments into technical alimony. Though
somewhat fictitious, the result is a defensible one. First, the designation
is no more arbitrary than the existing distinction that renders agree-
ments adopted by a court enforceable through contempt but denies that
treatment to agreements that have only been approved. Actually, it fol-
lows from that distinction because the only element missing from the
"approved" judgment is a judicial order, which is supplied here by the
decree of specific performance. Second, it would not require the viola-
tion of any constitutional principles. Because the court readily enforces
alimony payments through contempt, it could enforce these payments
without fear that it is frustrating the purposes of the constitution. In
essence, the payments made pursuant to a separation agreement would
retain their contractual nature in most circumstances. If, however,
upon application of an aggrieved spouse, a court determined that a de-
cree for specific performance was merited, it would then order that the
payments be made. At this point, the payments would have the force
ally, if an order is subject to enforcement by contempt, it is also subject to court modification. See,
e.g., White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 252 S.E.2d 698 (1979). Modifiability is not necessary for
logical consistency here, however, because a contempt citation presumably would be to enforce
the decree of specific performance and not to enforce the separation agreement per se.
73. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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of a court order and become alimony, just as they do when the court
orders a party to make the payments when it incorporates a separation
agreement into a divorce decree. Once the payments were denomi-
nated as alimony, they could be enforced through the court's contempt
power without violating the constitution. The most important implica-
tion of this result is that it would supply the aggrieved spouse with a
remedy she otherwise lacks, and would end the defenseless distinction
that allows a dependent spouse's support rights to rest upon the fortuity
of the incorporation of a separation agreement into a divorce decree.
The Moore case presented the supreme court with a scenario that
is far from uncommon yet still unresolved. The court's decision in that
case, however, brings North Carolina at least one step closer to a reso-
lution. The labeling of support payments incorporated into divorce de-
crees or adopted by the court at the time of the divorce as technical
alimony gives them a preferred position in the enforcement scheme be-
cause they are not considered a debt included in the prohibition against
imprisonment for debt and are thus subject to enforcement by con-
tempt. The Moore court has belatedly opened the door to a similar
treatment of unincorporated support provisions, and its decision is cer-
tain to have repercussions in subsequent North Carolina cases. An-
other opinion must be forthcoming, however, to establish the court's
position on the ultimate enforceability of the decree of specific per-
formance it has now authorized.
JANE WETTACH
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